Europe must strengthen shareholder rights and remove barriers to effective stewardship, argues AkademikerPension’s Anders Schelde
Europe wants long-term investors to finance its future. But if it wants our capital, it must also respect our right to question how that capital is used. The upcoming review of the Shareholder Rights Directive is a chance to make ownership mean something.
Europe is eager to attract investors. Their capital is needed to finance innovation, strengthen businesses and support the transition to a more resilient economy. Their opinions, however, sometimes seem considerably less welcome.
Investors are encouraged to take a long-term view, manage risks and act responsibly. Yet when they question corporate strategies, challenge management or ask uncomfortable questions about climate commitments, the enthusiasm for active ownership can quickly become rather more selective.
There is something fundamentally contradictory about that.
We believe that shareholders are not simply providers of capital. They are owners. And ownership comes with rights, including the right to disagree.
As the EU prepares to revise its Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II), it has an opportunity to ensure those rights can actually be exercised.
Returns matter – so does accountability
At AkademikerPension, we manage pension savings on behalf of our members. Our responsibility is to protect their long-term financial interests, which means understanding not only how companies generate profits today, but also the risks that could undermine their ability to do so tomorrow.
Climate change, violations of human rights, biodiversity loss, poor corporate governance and irresponsible political lobbying are not concerns that disappear simply because they are inconvenient to discuss. They can have very real financial consequences.
As investors, we therefore have both a legitimate interest in and a responsibility to question how companies manage these risks. That is not a rejection of profitability. It is part of protecting it.
Earlier this year, we put that principle into practice at Volvo. We filed a shareholder resolution calling for greater transparency around the company’s climate-related lobbying activities. Volvo has made public climate commitments, while the transition of its business depends significantly on policies supporting cleaner transport and the infrastructure needed to make it possible.
We wanted to understand whether the company’s political engagement, both directly and through industry associations, was consistent with those commitments.
A reasonable question, we thought, from the people whose capital helps finance the business. Volvo’s board opposed our proposal. Several other European institutional investors supported it, but the resolution was ultimately not adopted.
And that is entirely how shareholder democracy is supposed to work.
The purpose of shareholder rights is not to guarantee that investors always get their way. It is to ensure that they have the opportunity to raise concerns, challenge management and bring material issues before fellow shareholders.
We do not expect company boards to agree with us on every question. Frankly, that would make engagement a rather dull exercise. But we do expect the right to ask.
For us, shareholder resolutions are part of a broader engagement process. We prefer constructive dialogue, clear expectations and measurable progress. When that fails to deliver, however, investors must be able to escalate.
Dialogue without the possibility of escalation risks becoming little more than a polite conversation. And pension savers deserve more than that.
A shareholder right that never arrives
Across Europe, the practical exercise of shareholder rights remains unnecessarily difficult.
Investors face fragmented national rules, complex intermediary chains, inconsistent information flows and restrictive thresholds for submitting shareholder resolutions.
Votes can be lost or rejected before they reach the company. Information can arrive too late for investors to make informed decisions. And shareholders may find themselves navigating different procedural requirements simply because they invest across a national border.
For a European Union seeking to build integrated capital markets, this is a rather curious state of affairs. But these are not merely administrative inconveniences. They are obstacles to effective ownership.
The EU should therefore use the review to ensure reliable voting processes, timely access to information and more consistent opportunities for shareholders to participate in general meetings and submit resolutions.
Asking questions together is not a takeover
Meaningful stewardship also depends on investors’ ability to engage with companies, set expectations and, where necessary, join forces.
For institutional investors holding relatively small stakes in large multinational companies, collective engagement can be essential to making their voices heard. Yet legal uncertainty around acting-in-concert rules can discourage legitimate co-operation, including on climate-related financial risks.
There is a rather obvious difference between investors working together to challenge a company’s climate strategy and investors conspiring to take control of its boardroom.
European regulation should recognise that distinction.
The SRD review should provide greater legal certainty for collective engagement, ensuring that investors can collaborate on material risks without unnecessary fear of regulatory consequences. After all, there is a difference between having a common concern and seeking common control.
When shareholder rights become inconvenient
Developments across the Atlantic offer a timely reminder of what is at stake. In the US, shareholder engagement has become increasingly politicised, particularly when it concerns sustainability-related issues.
In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8, the longstanding mechanism allowing eligible shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion in companies’ proxy materials.
If adopted, the proposal would significantly change an established mechanism for shareholder accountability.
Meanwhile, regulatory scrutiny of collective investor engagement has contributed to uncertainty about the boundaries of legitimate shareholder cooperation.
Whatever one’s views on ESG, these developments raise a much broader question: Should investors really need political approval to exercise their rights as owners?
We would argue that it should not. The right to challenge management is not a threat to corporate governance. It is one of its foundations.
Investors need legal certainty, reliable voting mechanisms and meaningful opportunities to hold companies accountable
Capital comes with a voice
Europe now has an opportunity to reinforce that principle.
The review of the Shareholder Rights Directive should not be treated as a narrow technical exercise, nor should strengthening shareholder rights be viewed as something separate from the ambition to build attractive and well-functioning European capital markets.
The two are inseparable.
Investors need legal certainty, reliable voting mechanisms and meaningful opportunities to hold companies accountable. Those are not special privileges. They are part of the infrastructure that allows capital markets to function.
Responsible ownership is not about ensuring that investors always get their way. It is about ensuring that those who bear the financial risks of corporate decisions have the means to scrutinise them.
Sometimes investors will agree with management. Sometimes they will not. Sometimes engagement will lead to change, and sometimes a shareholder resolution will fail. That is not a weakness of the system. It is the system working as intended.
What would be a weakness is a framework that expects investors to take responsibility for long-term risks while denying them the tools to exercise meaningful influence. Europe should resist that contradiction.
Anders Schelde is the chief investment officer of AkademikerPension









